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Harris: Constitutional Law: Religious Practices in Public Schools

CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: RELIGIOUS PRACTICES
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Chamberlinv. Dade County Board of Public Instruction, 160 So. 2d
97 (Fla. 1964), rev'd in part per curiam, 84 Sup. Ct. 1272 (1964)
Plaintiffs, parents of school children, brought an action against
the Dade County Board of Public Instruction seeking to enjoin a
variety of alleged unconstitutional religious practices. The trial court
denied relief, and an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of
Florida, which affirmed the trial court. 2 Plaintiff then appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States, alleging the following five
activities to be unconstitutional as practiced in Dade County public
schools:
(1) Bible readings, pursuant to Florida Statutes, section
3
231.09 (2);
(2) recitation of religious prayers;
(3) religious baccalaureate programs;
(4) religious census among students;
4
(5) religious tests for teachers.
The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of School District
v. Schempp5 decided by the Court the same day. On remand the
Supreme Court of Florida HELD, the Bible readings and prayer
recitations constitutional because of the manifest secular intent of the
Florida Legislature in enacting section 231.09 (2), and that the plaintiffs had no standing to sue on the baccalaureate, census, and religious test issues. The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that plaintiffs lacked standing on the three latter issues because neither plaintiffs nor their children were school teachers, nor had they been subjected to a religious census or attended schools conducting religious
baccalaureate programs. This decision was again appealed to the
1. The trial court enjoined the showing of religious motion pictures, holding
of religious holiday pageants, and the permanent use of school property by
religious organizations, 17 Fla. Supp. 183 (Cir. Ct. 1961). Cf. Southside Estates
Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, 115 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1959) (temporary use
of school property by religious organization not unconstitutional).
2. 143 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1962).
3. FLA. STAT. §231.09(2) (1963) provides, "BIBLE READING. - Have, once
every school day, reading in the presence of the pupils from the Holy Bible, without
sectarian comment."
4. Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 160 So. 2d 97, 98 (Fla.

1964).
5.

374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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United States Supreme Court, which reversed6 the Bible reading and
prayer issues on the basis of School District v. Schempp. The Court,
however, agreed with the Florida court in part by dismissing the
baccalaureate, census, and religious test issues for lack of a properly
presented federal question in that plaintiffs had not been affected
by the alleged unconstitutional practices7
The United States Supreme Court stated that School District v.
Schempp, decided jointly with Murray v. Curlett, controlled the
Bible reading and prayer issues. The Schempp case involved a Pennsylvania law requiring Bible readings in public schools and the companion Murray case dealt with a Baltimore school board rule requiring Bible reading and recitation of prayers pursuant to a Maryland statute. Both laws were invalidated as unconstitutional establishments of religion in violation of the first amendment.
The Florida court attempted to avoid the Schempp mandate by
relying upon an alleged secular intent on the part of the Florida
Legislature in enacting section 231.09 (2), whereas the intent of the
Pennsylvania and Maryland statutes involved was not disclosed. When
section 231.09 (2) was originally enacted it contained the following
explanatory language: 8
Whereas, it is in the interest of good moral training, of a life
of honorable thought and good citizenship, that the public
school children should have lessons of morality brought to their
attention during their school day therefore Be it Enacted ....
Although the intent of the Maryland Legislature was not disclosed, the asserted distinction between the intent of the Pennsylvania and Florida Legislatures is erroneous. The secular intent
of the Pennsylvania Legislature was asserted in the appellant's brief
in Schempp; 9 moreover, Pennsylvania used language identical with
Florida's explanatory language when it enacted its statute requiring
Bible readings1 9 Even if the proclaimed legislative intent of Pennsylvania was not disclosed, the alleged distinction is without merit
under Torcaso v. Watkins," in which the United States Supreme
Court prohibited a state from requiring an applicant for a notary
commission to take an oath of belief in the existence of God. The
rationale of Torcaso is that a state cannot constitutionally require
participation in a religious activity to accomplish a secular purpose.
6. 84 Sup. Ct. 1272 (1964), per curiam.
7. Id. citing Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1945).
8. Fla. Laws 1925, ch. 10262.

9. Brief for the Appellant, p. 18, School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963).
10.
11.

Pa. Gen. Laws 1913, at 226; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §15-1516 (1959).
367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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The oath in Torcaso, similar to the Bible readings and prayer recitations in Chamberlin, represent an attempt by a state to use a religious means to accomplish a secular end. Therefore the legislature's
intent, even if secular, is not a proper basis for allowing the religious
practices in question.
The Florida Supreme Court stated at the end of the Chamberlin
opinion:

12

We have, without avail, endeavored to find, in the diverse
views expressed by the several justices of the United States
Supreme Court who participated in these decisions [Schempp
and Murray] a clear course for us to follow. It seems, therefore,
more fitting that the responsibility for an enlargement be left
to that Court ....
Apparently the Supreme Court of Florida is saying that if the
plaintiffs wish to have their civil rights determined they must go to
the federal courts. This is strange language from those who most
loudly profess a desire to minimize federal intervention. In light
of this language and the apparent disregard of the Schempp case it
appears that extra-legal factors must have played a large role in the
Florida court's decision. Perhaps one such factor was a desire to avoid
a publicly unpopular decision. Although the past Bible reading
cases 13 arguably protect religious freedom, a substantial segment of
the public disagrees with the decisions and feel they are morally
wrong. Another probable factor in the Chamberlin decision was a
desire to resist federal intervention. It should be realized, however,
that to resist in a negative and arbitrary manner can lead only to
increased federal activity. If a state desires to lessen federal intervention the only reasonable course open is the positive action of
assuring all litigants a forum for redress against alleged violations of
their constitutional rights.
Although dismissed for lack of standing, the three remaining
issues of the Chamberlin case involve an interesting set of constitutional problems. The religious census, which involved keeping a
record of religious preference of students, appears to be constitutional
so long as the information is taken on a voluntary and confidential
basis and used only for bona fide school purposes by professional personnel. On the other hand, religious tests requiring teacher applicants to answer the question, "Do you believe in God?' 14 and the

12.

160 So. 2d at 99.

13.
14.

School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 84 Sup. Ct. 1272

(1964).
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consideration of religious attitudes in making promotions,15 appear
to be unconstitutional under the Torcaso rationale. Significantly,
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in part, 6 cited Torcaso and stated
he felt the religious test issue was properly presented.
The most uncertain question in Chamberlinis the constitutionality
of religious baccalaureate programs. The first amendment provides
that, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ."17 It is submitted
that the relationship of the "free exercise" and "establishment" clauses
will be a determinative factor in the constitutionality of the baccalaureate programs. The United States Supreme Court clearly does
not consider all school activities of a religious nature to be an unconstitutional establishment of religion. 8 It has distinguished Bible
reading and prayer recitation from activities such as the singing of
"God Bless America" - the latter being considered as merely ceremonial. 9 The degree of threat to "free exercise" by an alleged unconstitutional religious practice will affect the amount of state activity
necessary to become an "establishment of religion." This principle
can be demonstrated by comparing McCollum v. Board of Education2
and Zorach v. Clauson.21 In McCollum, sectarian religious instruction
was given on public school property during school hours by teachers
working for private religious groups. Students not wishing to take
religious instruction were required to go to other classrooms and
continue their secular studies. The United States Supreme Court held
the program to be an unconstitutional establishment of religion. In
Zorach, sectarian religious instruction was given on nonschool property at various religious centers. The students who wished to have
the instruction were dismissed from classes while all others remained
at their secular work. The United States Supreme Court held this
program to be constitutional despite a contention that "the weight
and influence of the school is put behind ... [the] program .. . ."22
Apparently the different results on similar religious programs stemmed
from the Court's belief that the McCollum plan constituted a greater
danger to the free exercise of religion than the Zorach plan.
The instructional plans of McCollum and Zorach are analogous
to the baccalaureate programs of Chamberlin. Thus, the constitutionality of baccalaureate programs will apparently be determined by the
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Ibid.
Ibid.
U. S. CONsr. amend. 1.

Cf. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (concurring opinion).
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962).
333 U.S. 203 (1948).

21. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
22. Id. at 309.
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